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1. Introduction 
The approximately 150-year-old functionalistic way of thinking has always had a very dizzy 
position in sociology. On the one hand, since the birth of the discipline, functionalism has 
been an essential part of sociological thinking. This holds true especially for the analysis of 
macro level phenomena, including society as a whole with its structural characteristics and 
developmental tendencies. On the other hand since the birth of the discipline, functionalism 
has also been a target of harsh criticism, a kind of mirror against which other theoretical 
traditions have formulated their specific viewpoints and sharpened their theoretical 
arsenals. One reason for the criticism has been a specific characteristic of functionalistic 
theories, namely, that since Comte’s theorizing, biology-based evolutionary and 
physiological analogies and thought structures have been an important factor in these 
theories. This is still a case, as demonstrated by the functionalistic theories from Talcott 
Parsons (Henderson, 1928:17), blood circulation and its stabilizing mechanisms) to Niklas 
Luhmann (Varela and Maturana (1980), self-organizing systems), which search their 
inspiration partly from biological theories. In addition, most of the discussion concerning 
functional analysis as a method has been going on in the ‘interfaces’ of biology and 
sociology (see, for example, Ariew, et al., 2002). 
The stubbornness of functionalism partly relates to the birth of sociology as a discipline. 
From the middle of the 19th century onwards, the new discipline tried to justify its 
independency by showing that its object of research – society – was a distinctive object on its 
own. The founding fathers of the discipline, above all Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and 
Emile Durkheim, conceptualized society as analogous with the biological organism as a 
whole differentiated in parts, with each specialized part taking care of its specific task so 
that together they comprised a functioning unity. According to their views, neither the 
relationships between the different institutions of society nor the dynamics of change in the 
whole were reducible to the goal–directed actions and intentions of individuals, nor could 
they be explained on the grounds of their biological constitution with its specific traits. They 
operated according to their own laws, which also made it necessary to develop distinct 
theoretical models and research methods specific to society as a functioning unity (Heilbron, 
1995:270-71; Kangas, 2006:24,252). In addition, the meaning of these new models and 
methods was not only theoretical but also practical. They were related to the social mission 
of the new discipline. Firstly, to demonstrate that there is, after all, order in the world, 
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although it seems to have disappeared along with ongoing industrialism with its incessant 
social tumults and the thriving utilitarian individualism caused by it. Secondly, by doing so, 
the task was to encourage confidence in the possibilities of humans to bring about order and 
mould their social world according to their wishes and needs. 
The above-mentioned model of social differentiation based on the analogy with a biological 
organism is in sociology called the ‘decomposition paradigm’ of social differentiation on the 
grounds that social change in this model is conceptualized as similar to the development of 
an organism from an undifferentiated embryo to the fully matured form composed of 
functionally differentiated parts, each specialized in different tasks necessary for the 
survival of the organism. The concept of function in this model has a two-fold meaning: 
structural and dynamical. From the structural point of view, the concept of function directs 
attention to the different parts and their relationships and to their respective tasks in the 
whole. From the dynamical point of view, the concept of function allows one to see the 
processes of change as the unfolding of functional differentiation, as the development of an 
entity from unspecific and undifferentiated, different functions merging ‘homogeneity’ to 
fully developed, in specialized tasks differentiated ‘heterogeneity’, to use Herbert Spencer’s 
vocabulary (Maynz, 1988:14; Stichweh, 1994; Tyrell, 1998:129-34; Stichweh, 2007:534). 
Hartmann Tyrell (1998:125) has quite justifiably claimed that the differentiation problematic 
in sociology has been so tightly interwoven with the organism –optics that even the 
significance of this bond is mostly left unnoticed in sociology. This claim is also tenable for 
the method of functionalism, the functional analysis. It is still understood predominantly 
and rather straightforwardly through the organism metaphor, as will be shown below.  
Although the ‘biologically’ inspired theorizing of the founding fathers nowadays seems 
very outdated, then it was a very modern strand of thought, because the former substance –
centered thought was substituted by thinking in relational terms. The reference of the 
concepts was no longer in the preconceptually existing ‘ontic’ entities; the concepts with 
their references take on meaning in accordance with the reciprocal relations they are set to. 
As Ernst Cassirer (1990 [1910]:403), one of the first who thematized the change happening, 
says in his early book Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: ‘In this way we don’t recognize 
things but we recognize materially (gegenständlich) by during the flow of the same kind of 
experience contents setting certain kind of limitations and by fixing certain durable elements 
and reciprocal connections’. In mathematical notation this is expressed by the formula 
‘y=f(x)’, in which both the abandonment of ontological and epistemological ‘constants’ and 
the dependency of all values on operations come to the fore. This means that the only 
constant in functionalism is uncertainty in terms of the observation and its objects, and 
consequently in terms of knowledge per se, as Armin Nassehi (2008a:91) says. Functionalism 
is so clearly part of the breakthrough of modern science, in which the status of scientific 
knowledge radically changed as the view of relativity of all knowledge, its dependency on 
language and observations and the resulting uncertainty gained a stronger hold.  
2. The early critique of functionalism 
The indisputable connection with the spirit of the times however did not do much to smooth 
functionalism’s way; it has been an object of harsh criticism from the beginning on. It could 
be claimed with good reason that the main points of criticism, which have been repeated in 
critiques ever since, were already formulated in ‘anti-sociological’ writings (Merz-Benz and 
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Wagner, 2001) at the turn of the twentieth century. For Wilhelm Dilthey (1923 [1883]:90, 105-
9) the differentiation theory à la Comte and Spencer, built upon an analogy with the 
biological organism, or conceptualized through ‘bioteleology’ as Hartmann Tyrell (1998:131) 
characterizes it, was nothing but a form progressive philosophy of history. According to its 
theory of the phases of history, it believed it had found not only the real telos of historical 
changes, but also the scientific devices to control and assist the development of societies. 
According to Dilthey (1923 [1883]:104-9) the conceptual apparatus and methods of the late 
19th century human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) had already outdated theories based 
on ‘naturalistic metaphysics’, as he in one connection characterizes them.  
Also Max Weber (1988 [1922]:1-145, 291-383) dissociates himself from all kind of 
‘collectivistic’ and ‘organic’ speculations, as well from the holism-related thinking of the 
German historical school and the doctrines of sociology (1985 [1922]:1-11). Society as a 
concept had for Weber no such comparable theoretical status as it had and still has in the 
differentiation theories based on the decomposition paradigm, in which society is both the 
benefiter of the outputs of function systems and the guarantor of the integration of these 
specialized subsystems (Parsons, 1966; Tyrell, 1994). Nor does Weber allow functionalism as 
method the same kind of significance it has in the decomposition paradigm –as a way of 
analyzing or explaining social phenomena on the basis of their supposed tasks or 
accomplishments. Functional descriptions alone, according to Weber, are insufficient as 
explanations, although as heuristic or preliminary questions they could at best direct 
attention to an analysis of social action relevant to the phenomena requiring explanation. As 
Weber insisted, however, an adequate sociological explanation of social phenomena is 
possible only on the basis of an ‘interpretative’ understanding of social action. Consistently 
with his rejection of functionalism, and of the progressivism the decomposition paradigm 
implies, Weber mainly refrains from using the concept of differentiation in his writings. On 
those few occasions he that does, the differentiation thematic is attached to the different life 
spheres (Lebensordnungen) in their specificity and their peculiar ways of rationalizing and, 
as Tyrell (1994:394-96; 1998:142-43) points out, not to the society as a whole, which is 
interpreted as a carrier of the differentiation process.  
Both of the above-mentioned critiques, Dilthey’s argument about the decomposition 
paradigmatic differentiation theory as a new form of a teleological philosophy of history; 
and Weber’s insistence on the heuristic nature of functional considerations and the need to 
replace them in the last instance with explanations based on the action and interactions of 
individuals, recur again and again in the critiques of functionalism. The presumption of the 
goal directness of the historical processes of metamorphosis of societies, together with the 
supposition of the unilinearity of the processes of change in different societies, are the 
standard targets of criticism of functional theories, and of one of their offspring: 
modernization theories (see, for example, Elster, 1978:187-225; Berger, 1996). The claims of 
the insufficiency of the functionalistic argumentations and the need to replace them by 
explanations based on the action frame of reference are also recurrent themes in the critiques 
(see, for example, Giddens, 1984:293-97; Schwinn, 2003).  
One interesting aspect of Dilthey’s and Weber’s theorizing, which is of great importance in 
the following argumentation, needs to be noted here. Due to his ‘society abstinence’ and 
reluctance to speak about differentiation, it often passes unnoticed that Weber’s theory 
(together with Georg Simmel’s differentiation vision, left out here) nevertheless belongs to 
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the ‘family’ of differentiation theories, especially to the form of differentiation theory that 
was explicitly spelled out by Wilhelm Dilthey. Hartman Tyrell (1998:138-45) is one of the 
few who has paid attention to this continuum. He has argued that parallel to Dilthey, who 
understood differentiation not as a differentiation of society but as processes happening in 
society via the constitution of different cultural systems (including law, art, religion), Weber 
speaks about the rise of different kinds of incommensurable life orders (Lebensordnungen), 
each following their own kind of logic and ways of rationalization. Accordingly, as Weber 
(1988 [1920-1921) spells out in the famous ‘Zwischenbetrachtung’ in his sociological studies 
on religion, their reciprocal relationships are not only supportive of each other as is often 
presumed in the decomposition paradigm, but vary from beneficial via indifferential to 
openly conflicting. 
Therefore, the question of the processes of differentiation is not about the partition of society 
into different task-specific subsystems, vis-à-vis the division of labour in organizations. It is 
about the constitution of different cultural systems, each of them having their own peculiar 
relevance criterion for processing meaning and the logic of development based on it, not 
reducible to intentions of individuals or their acts of giving meaning. Cultural systems are, 
as Dilthey (1923 [1883]:45) in one connection says, in regard to individual acts of meaning 
giving second order concepts. There is remarkable similarity here to the way Niklas 
Luhmann outlines social systems in his theory. For Luhmann the subsystems of society are 
second order phenomena; they are based on second order observation, that is, each 
subsystem of society processes communicative meanings according to its own specific code 
(true/false, legal/illegal etc.) and rules (theories, laws etc.). The subsystems and their 
borders are so constituted and maintained in the self-referential process of recursive making 
and remaking of connections between respective differently specified events, 
communicative operations; the different systemic networking processes have a sort of 
‘Eigenlogik’ in respect to each other and to individuals’ psychic processing of 
communicative meanings (Luhmann, 1984:148-90; 1997:743-88). Taking into consideration 
the similarities in the approach to differentiation in these theories, Hartmann Tyrell´s (1998) 
and Alois Hahn´s (1999) assertions that there is a clear continuum from Dilthey and Weber 
to Luhmann seems to be well grounded. Tyrell (1998:145) even defines it to be a specific 
German tradition of differentiation theory with no equivalents elsewhere, and claims 
(1994:395) that Luhmann’s way of characterizing modern society as ‘polycontextural’, as a 
‘society without a top or centre’, would have come to Dilthey and Weber as no surprise.  
3. On the later history of functionalistic thinking 
Critique directed at functionalism from the very beginning did not in any case slow down 
its rise to becoming the reigning paradigm in the social sciences. Although it is not possible 
to speak about a uniform theory, the period until the mid-20th century, when Talcott Parsons 
formulated his structural-functionalistic theory based on the concept of the functional 
necessities of society, which is a certain kind of systematization and codification of the 
tradition, was a time of functionalism’s triumphal march in anthropology (for example 
Malinowski, Levi-Strauss, Radcliffe-Brown) as well as in sociology. Illustrative of the 
tradition’s significance is that Kingsley Davis in his presidential address to the American 
Sociological Association’s annual meeting in 1959 states that speaking of functional analysis 
as a special method of its own is misleading. And Davis claims (1959:757), referring to the 
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structural-functional theory, that leaving terminological matters aside, functional analysis is 
what all sociologists actually do, whether they admit it or not, because it is synonymous 
with sociological analysis, alternatives to it being reductionist anti-theoretical empiricism 
and ideological or moralistic thinking in the disguise of sociology. However, the tides were 
changing, and against the Davis’ credo and manifesto, functionalism fell under heavy 
criticism, the object of which was especially functionalism in the form Talcott Parsons had 
given it in his structural-functionalistic phase. Functionalism was gradually marginalized 
up to the point, where Anthony Giddens (1977:96) at the end of 70’s could assert that 
functionalism was no longer worthy of being a serious discussion partner.  
Giddens’s judgment of the death of functionalism was premature. Parsons’ functionalistic 
heritage lives on as can be seen from the numerous writings of neofunctionalistic theorists, 
who have not only reworked it to answer the criticism, but also extended the analysis from 
its former reference point of the nation state to an analysis of wider globalization processes 
(see, for example, Alexander, 1998; Münch, 2001). Functionalism also pops up in places 
where it could least be expected to be found, namely in the tradition of critical theory à la 
Jürgen Habermas (1981), where it has a central place in his systems concept, so much so that 
he tries to present it under the subtitle ‘A critique of functionalist reason’. In that part of 
Habermas’s theory, the influence of one of his main contestants, Niklas Luhmann’s brand of 
functionalism is clearly discernible. There are good reasons to argue that Luhmann, and the 
systems theoretical sociology inaugurated by him, has done the most in recent theoretical 
discussion to bring functionalism, both as a method analysis and as a substantial theory of 
society, to the fore again.  
However, an interesting point to note concerning Luhmann’s theory is that as a 
differentiation theory of society, it is connected to a tradition of thinking that is deeply 
hostile to functionalism, both as a method and theory, as was pointed out in the above 
discussion concerning the ‘German tradition’ of differentiation theory. Two questions 
concerning Luhmann’s theory follow from this. Firstly, the abandonment of the 
decomposition paradigm means that Luhmann is compelled to frame the idea of functional 
analysis differently, both in terms of its starting points and in terms of its usage; but how 
does Luhmann do it? Secondly, if functional analysis is disengaged from the decomposition 
paradigm, is it any longer possible to speak about functional differentiation, or has the 
terminology plainly become misleading in this context? Luhmann offers his functionalism 
and concept of functional analysis as a remedy to the problems of functionalism we discuss 
later, but what is the price to be paid for this reformulation and what are its advantages?  
4. What is functional analysis and for what?    
To give a short description of the basic premises of functional analysis is to say that the main 
interest of functional analysis is on the effects or consequences of the phenomena, quite the 
contrary to causal observations, where attention is on preceding events and factors as 
explanations and reasons for the existence of a phenomenon under consideration. To count 
as a functional relation, inference from effects to the existence of a phenomenon requires 
that two further conditions be fulfilled. Firstly, the consequences, which are of main interest 
in functional analysis, should not be based on the conscious intentions to bring them about. 
That is, they should not be the results of goal-directed actions that specifically aim at 
bringing into being the phenomenon because of its longed for effects, even if social 
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phenomena are in the last instance always based on the actions and interactions of 
individuals. If the condition is not met, the function in question belongs to the category of 
manifest functions, to use Robert Merton’s (1968:105, 114-18) classic vocabulary. This form 
of functional analysis causes no problems because the existence of the phenomenon under 
consideration is ultimately explained by the intentional action of individuals. The question 
then is a reduction of an explanation to a normal intentional explanation, to a form that 
Wolfgang Stegmüller (1983:642) calls ‘genuine material teleology’, on the grounds that the 
explanation in the last instance is reducible to a common causal explanation, if the reasons 
or intentions of action are interpreted as motives, as effective causes of actions. Secondly, 
not every type of accidental phenomenon with its consequences counts as functions, only 
those with some kind of peculiar hidden goal directness, ‘Zweckmässgikeit ohne Zweck’: it 
almost seems as if they have some kind of ‘social call’ to which they respond by solving 
some of the existence problems of the social arrangement they become part of. Merton 
(1968:105) calls these non-intentional but non-accidental phenomena-consequences –
relations latent functions, and considers these the most interesting in sociology, because 
studying them brings knowledge of the ‘reasons’ of being of different constituents of society 
and of their veiled relations in social arrangements. 
Functional analysis in the form that Merton (1968:106) has given it is rather easy to accept, 
because he does not think that functional analysis can alone offer a sufficient explanation for 
the existence of the phenomena under scrutiny. Quite the contrary, he insists on finding the 
specific social mechanisms which bring about the social institutions satisfying the presumed 
functional ‘needs’ attributed to the object of research. In spite of this specification and its 
merits, Merton’s way of doing functional analysis is not without problems. His 
argumentation in some connections has certain tautological nuances which result from 
inferring functionality from the existence of a phenomenon, instead of defining the ‘needs’ 
of the object independently of phenomena characterized as functional, and thus breaking 
the tautological circle. Functional analysis becomes problematic when all caution, so 
characteristic of Merton’s analysis, is given up and functional analysis is rather 
straightforwardly interpreted as explaining the existence of phenomenon by showing how it 
responds to the existential exigencies of the object under scrutiny and in so doing helps its 
survival (see, for example, Hempel, 1965:308; Giddens, 1984:295). This ambition of giving an 
explanation was one of the main reasons for the bad reputation of functional analysis. In the 
wave of neopositivist critique it was close to becoming extinct as a special approach or as a 
special methodology of functionalistic tradition, as the title of the one recent book on the 
subject, Soziologisher Funktionalismus. Zur Methodologie einer Theorietradition, edited by Jens 
Jerkowitz and Carsten Stark (2003), defines it.  
The neopositivist critique of functionalism is valid also regarding the main tradition of 
functionalism in modern sociology, namely Talcott Parsons’ theory. Parsons (1949) 
introduced his theory as an analytical conceptual framework for studying the essential 
prerequisites of social order, not as an explanatory theory. He was neither very interested in 
methodological questions and there are very view scattered remarks on functionalism as a 
method in his writings (see, for example, 1951:29). Parsons’ theory, however, is not as far 
from being an explanatory theory as he thinks. If a social system is defined as a boundary 
holding system with four basic predefined functional prerequisites, as in Parsons’ AGIL-
scheme, and if differentiation is conceptualized as adaptive upgrading, that is, 
differentiation as structuration of the social system along the lines of functional 
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prerequisites (see e.g. Parsons, 1964; 1966:5-29), then the theory seems to offer an 
explanatory ‘top-down logic’ (Nassehi, 2008a:93) that explains the events in the social world 
together with the direction of changes irrespective of the intentions and goals of individuals, 
the actors being thus reduced to ‘judgmental doves’, as a popular Parson critique in the ‘60s 
declared (Garfinkel, 1987).  
5. From functional explanation to functional analysis 
It is time to summarize the discussion concerning the basic characteristics and problematic 
of functional researching. The classical formulation of the basic model of functional 
explanation as well as the analysis of problematic related to it stems from Carl Hempel. On 
the assumption that functional analysis aims at giving an explanation to the existence of a 
phenomenon, Hempel (1965:310; see also Cummins, 1975) has studied whether the 
functional claims can validly be formulated in the form of a deductive-nomological 
syllogism. Supposing that we are interested in explaining the occurrence of a trait i in a 
system s (at a certain time t). Is the following inference valid as an explanation for the 
existence of an item i? 
a. At t, s functions adequately in a setting of kind c (characterized by specific internal and 
external conditions). 
b. s functions adequately in a setting kind c if a certain necessary condition, n, is satisfied. 
c. If trait i were present in s, then, as an effect, condition n would be satisfied. 
d. Hence, at t, trait i is present in s. 
The answer is a simple and plain no. Even if we leave aside the problems related to the 
inverse causation, an explanation from effects to the existence of a phenomenon, there 
abundant problems related to the model. To begin with, the syllogism is not logically valid; 
claim (d) does not follow from the premises, because some alternative functionally 
equivalent trait j would perfectly well be sufficient to fulfill the condition n. And secondly, if 
the condition (c) is made stricter by claiming that the presence of a trait i is functionally 
indispensable for the satisfaction of n, we have a logically valid inference that unfortunately 
is empirically useless or simply wrong, because the trait i almost always has either 
empirically existent or at least imaginable functionally equivalent substitutes.  
Hempel’s (1965:318-25; see also Stegmüller, 1983:687-706) critique of functional analysis, 
especially of the empirical application of the method, may be summarized as concentrating 
on the following aspects. Talk about the functional requirements or needs of a system, as 
well as the obligation of noting their possible functional equivalents, presupposes that the 
criteria delimiting the system, its borders, state, ways of functioning and possible tendencies 
of change related to these have been defined as precisely as possible. Without this kind of 
specification of the system in question, including the empirical operationalization of the 
respective functional concepts, there is the risk of the analysis becoming tautological by 
inferring functionality from the existence of a phenomenon and explaining its existence 
thereof. And the menace of deforming the analysis by imposing researcher’s own ideals and 
values as ideals or descriptions of the adequate way of functioning of systems, is always 
present. In addition, as Hempel states, if satisfying the specification level needed for 
functional analysis, even in the case of biological systems, is hard to achieve, the problems 
multiply when it comes to applying functional analysis to social systems.  
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The numerous critical discussions since concerning the application of functional analysis 
and systems theoretical models in social sciences have shown how right Hempel was in his 
judgment. Recurrent themes in these discussions concern: the difficulties of defining the 
borders of social systems as well as specifying the criteria for social change; accusations of 
conservatism, of justifying the present social structure, the status quo, as the best possible 
form; and accusations of positioning the developmental path leading to present state of 
society as an universal and unilinear model of social structural changes. Hempel’s 
concluding judgment is that at best functional analysis has only heuristic meaning; it is 
possible to use it as a scheme in assessing the system likeness of an object, especially 
regarding its self-regulatory mechanisms related to the environment.  
Ernst Nagel (1972:68-9; see also Cummins, 1975:743-45), another prominent neopositivist 
philosopher of science, starts his analysis of functional explanation from the supposition 
that it aims at giving an explanation to the existence of the object under scrutiny. Nagel 
(1979 [1961]:421-24) moves the focus of functional analysis from the self-preservation of a 
system in an environment to an examination of the inner constitution of complex wholes; to 
the study of the features, relationships and operations of different parts of the system as far 
as they are distinctive to the typical ways functioning of an entity. His final judgement 
concerning the capacity of functional analysis to yield an explanation to the existence of 
phenomena, both in natural sciences and especially in social sciences, is as critical as 
Hempel’s.  
However, Nagel’s analysis was a kind of watershed in the discussion concerning functional 
analysis, because he delineates two alternative ways to understand the purpose of the 
method. One possibility is to continue the attempts to find unfailing grounds for the 
assertion that functional analysis is a distinct and genuine form of explanation of its own. 
The other possibility is to give up the ambition of offering explanations entirely and instead 
tie up the functional approach to an analysis of the ways complex unities function. The 
former choice is presented by different selectionist neo-teleogical approaches, which try to 
show that in the context of evolution theory functional explanations are completely valid. 
According to them, the existence of a trait or feature is justifiably explainable on the basis of 
the evolutionary advantages it offers to its carriers in the selection processes happening at 
the level of population (see e.g. Wright, 1973; Neander, 1991; Milligan, 2002). The latter form 
of functional analysis is put forward by Robert Cummins (1975, 2002). He criticises neo-
teleologists for merging two different independent forms of explanations: the explanation 
for the existence of a phenomenon and the explanation of the function of a phenomenon, 
together. By so doing they trivialize natural selection by jumping over the messy history of a 
trait coming into being, the process being insensitive to the function in question. Cummins 
disengages functional analysis altogether from the task of giving an explanation for the 
presence of a trait and confines it solely to an analysis of the inner composition of the whole, 
and its capacities to perform such-and-such things under consideration. A corollary of this is 
that items or traits have no absolute functions, but the effects are always perspective-related 
and connected to the capacities or dispositions of the system, which are of interest at the 
given time. Cummins’ sort of functionalism has with good reason been labelled as 
pragmatist and observation-relative (see e.g. Milligan, 2002; Wortmann, 2007). According to 
it, functional analysis has an important role in evolution research, but functionality is not the 
principle behind the series of changes happening in evolution. 
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6. Niklas Luhmann’s contingency functionalism 
Independently of Robert Cummins above mentioned work, this is the direction Niklas 
Luhmann has developed his own account of functional analysis. Luhmann (1970b) criticized 
earlier sociological discussion for not making a clear enough distinction between 
functionalism as a substantial theory of society and functionalism as a research method. If 
the list of necessary functions, derived from the study of society as a system and its 
presumed requirements of existence and model of evolutionary changes, is rejected, and 
instead the research starts from the premise that forms of differentiation are but historically 
conditioned structural shapes of societies and accomplishments of evolution, not its goals 
(see, for example, Luhmann, 1997:413-516), the question of a functional method has to be 
framed in a new way. According to Luhmann the key to this remodeling can already be 
found in the early functional studies: the question of explaining the phenomenon on the 
grounds of its task (such as Malinowski’s analysis of certain kind of rituals and forms of 
magic as adaptation mechanisms, the existence of which is based on the relief they offer in 
situations causing emotional stress in a social community) is, in fact a question of the 
problem and its solution. This more general formulation also opens up the possibility of 
determining alternative solutions to the problem. For Luhmann, functional analysis is 
primarily a ‘regulative principle’, through which the search is made to find for existence of a 
phenomenon a relevant ‘reference problem’ as well as possible functionally equivalent 
alternative solutions. Accordingly, Luhmann (1970a; 1984:83-91) calls his method equivalent 
functionalism. The existence of functional equivalents is not for Luhmann, as it was for neo-
positivists Hempel and Nagel, part of the problems connected with functional analysis, but 
part of the solution, the price of which is giving up the idea of functional analysis as an 
explanatory method in a strict sense. Instead of giving an account of the genesis of a social 
phenomenon, functional analysis directs the attention to the question of how, among many 
functionally equivalent alternatives, this particular way of solving the problem is 
maintained and reproduced in a social setting (Luhmann, 1970a:27). This had already been 
pointed out by Robert Merton (1968:127). For Luhmann, the greatest achievement of the 
earlier functionalist tradition was the handling of this problem/problem solving scheme, 
however implicitly it was done.  
Luhmann (1970a; 1984:83-91) thus considers functional analysis to be an independent 
method reducible neither to causal analysis nor to teleological explanation, and 
characterizes it as a comparative method. Through finding and constructing functional 
equivalent solutions to a reference problem, which could be posited either on the side of 
causes or on the side of effects depending on the study (1970a:17) it aims at demolishing the 
self-evidence that often characterizes social institutions and by so doing opens up social 
order for the study of its constitutive conditions. In addition, methods alienating purpose 
also allows insight into equivalent problem solutions behind the seemingly very different 
social phenomena, as is the case, for instance, in functional subsystems of society according 
to Luhmann’s (1997:42) analysis. In a way, Luhmann’s scheme of analysis (social 
phenomena/solution -> problem delineation) inverts functional analysis top-down. The 
starting points of analysis are not the aprioristically defined system problems, but solutions 
to which relevant problems are then delineated, the purpose being to delimit other kinds of 
solutions to the problems and by so doing to show the contingent character of the existent 
solution, that is, social phenomena (see e.g. Schneider, 2009:64-5). Not allowing variation on 
the side of the reference problems, but instead, reifying (originally empirically defined) 
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problems as the sole problems (as Parsons does with respect to AGIL –schema) has, 
according to Nassehi (2008a:93-4; 2008b:13), been the main reason for the bad reputation of 
functionalism. It is from this impasse that Luhmann hopes to save functional analysis.  
It could be claimed that Luhmann’s approach and method of functional analysis satisfy the 
criteria defining the ‘new empiricism’, set forward in recent discussion by authors 
demanding a new kind of orientation, ‘aposteriorist non-normative analysis’ (Lash, 2009) or 
‘descriptive assemblage’ (Mike Savage, 2009) in empirical research. As the ‘new empiricism’ 
demands, Luhmann’s analysis does not start from aprioristic, value-related presumptions 
and normative ideals concerning social order and social change directing research at the 
outset. Neither does it aim at producing a ‘deep model’ of social life with all the 
suppositions concerning the essential causal factors and main variables (class, gender, 
national community and so on) to be taken into account as explanans. In this respect 
Luhmann operates with what Bruno Latour (2009:51) calls a ‘flat concept of society’, a way 
of outlining society, free of the above mentioned starting points and suppositions.  
Functional analysis as method and system theory as substantial theory of the social world 
are anyhow closely connected in Luhmann’s (1970b:38; see also Schneider, 2009:52-71) 
sociological oeuvre. This is the point where Luhmann departs from Merton, whose 
definition of functional analysis he accepted to a great extent. He steps on the side of 
Parsons because Merton was reluctant to define a whole in respect to something is said to be 
functional (Stephen P. Savage, 1981:139-42). For Luhmann the horizon of possible problems 
and solutions opened up by the application of functional analysis are always relative to the 
system under investigation. In addition, reduction in the number of the alternative problems 
opened up and their functionally equivalent solutions is only possible by taking into 
account the system relative limitations, constraints occurring from the state, the composition 
and ways of functioning of a system under consideration. 
In the Luhmannian tradition of systems thinking, the substantial theory is about the 
existence and reproduction of operative and dynamic social systems composed of networks 
of communication episodes, emerging and continuing in time from one event to the next, 
forming an emergent system not reducible to the psychic processing of communication 
(Luhmann, 1995). The lasting fundamental problem concerning the system’s constitution 
and maintenance, which at the same time is the most general theoretical and theory 
technical reference problem of the theory in question, is the control of the ever present 
contingency related to the linking of communicative episodes in time (Nassehi, 2007:170; 
2008b:377-94; Luhmann, 2010:29). Luhmann uses the concept of structure as the most 
general answer to this problem. The function of structures is to make possible autopoiesis, 
self-reproduction of the systems, by making certain kinds of linkages between 
communicative episodes possible, and expected, as they at the same time bar other ways of 
linking communicative episodes (Luhmann, 1984:377-94).  
This is the point where the abstract theory of social systems and the method related to it, 
functional analysis, need to be integrated with empirical observation. There are no 
aprioristic answers to be found to the question of how communication is structured and to 
which problems they are answers, neither from the (implicit) rationality structures of 
language and communication (Habermas), nor from the list of necessary functions to be 
derived from the presumed conditions for the existence of social systems (Parsons). The 
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problems, as Nassehi (2007:170) aptly emphasizes, are first of all practical problems related 
to the continuance of communication, or more commonly expressed, problems of linking 
actions to each other in real time, in the contexts of interaction, organization as well as 
society. On an abstract level, functional analysis may be used to define and characterize the 
different types of systems having their own kind of logic of connectivity; interaction, 
organization and society in their theoretical specificity (see e.g. Luhmann, 1997:813-47). In 
regard to empirical research this means that one has to take into account that 
communication happens often, if not always, at the intersection of different types of systems 
and contextures, formed by the differentiation of society into various functional subsystems, 
each structuring communication in its own way. In its ‘thickest’ form communication occurs 
as interaction in organizational contexts, where, in addition to the two mentioned systems, 
interaction and organization with their different logics of connectivity, the resources (and 
restrictions) coming from functional subsystems (scientific knowledge, economic resources, 
legal norms and so on) have an enormous conditioning role. 
As an example of this kind of ‘polycontextural’ (Vogd, 2009:107) or ‘multisystem 
inclusiveness’ (Stichweh, 2000:16) Armin Nassehi (2008a:97) gives an illustration of decision 
making in a medical context. While making a decision, a doctor has to take into account at 
the same time the specific interaction context and its demands, the decision-making 
structure of the organization with the time limits it sets, scientific medical knowledge 
related to the case in question, legal and normative regulation, and economic resources, to 
mention some. From the point of view of functional analysis, this means that understanding 
the specific logic of connectivity of communication episodes requires that several different 
communication contexts in their specificity have to be taken into consideration at the same 
time. Different contexts with their specific logic of connectivity both open up and restrict 
possibilities for networking communication episodes. The formulation of reference 
problems and making of the solutions or their insolubleness presuppose in empirical 
analysis an understanding and attention to the logic of working of different kind of 
simultaneously existing and communication conditioning contexts and their respective 
reference problems, to put it into words of Luhmannian functional analysis.  
Formulated more generally with the help of the three dimensions meaning (fact, time and 
social dimension) differentiated by Luhmann (1984:111-35), functional analysis requires that in 
analyzing the way the fundamental contingency (that is the degrees of freedom related to all 
the possible ways of linking communicative events to each other), is conditioned, one has to 
take into account at the same time very different kinds of systems. Both the restrictions and 
possibilities related to relevant factually differently orientated functional subsystems (legal 
system, political system, economy and so on), limitations and allowances entailed by 
organizations working with different time horizons, and the opportunities and hindrances 
coming from different interaction contexts each defining the inclusion criteria its own way (see 
e.g. Saake and Nassehi, 2007). In different contexts of communication the same kind of 
problems are solved, but they are not solved in the same way; and how this is done in one 
context affects to various degrees other contexts as well (see, for example, Nassehi, 2008a:102).  
To sum up the above discussion, the reference problems of functional analysis are not 
presumed or aprioristically defined system problems. The raison d’être of functional 
analysis is, as Luhmann (1970a:19-20; 1984:84) says, seeing the society as a ‘problem system’, 
in which the different ways of structuring communication are analyzed as problem 
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solutions, with attention paid at the same time to the fact that solutions are dependent on 
how and by which problem definitions and structures problems are solved elsewhere in a 
system.   
7. The differentiation of society and its functionality 
Luhmann’s remodeled version of functional analysis constructed around the concept of 
contingency is quite defensible and elegant. It offers promising ways to handle situations 
where analyzed phenomena are at the intersection of many systems, and part of this 
contextualization procedure is also the societal positioning of a phenomenon by way of 
theoretical specification of the structural specifica of modern society (see e.g. Nassehi, 
2006:375-468; Vogd, 2009). However, behind the differentiation processes there is no 
‘immament’ teleology to be found, which would, in relation to the survival imperatives of 
society, mould the process to increasingly effective forms of division and organization of 
labour (see, for example, Tyrell, 1978). Instead, the differentiation process is conceptualized 
as an evolvement of different kind of contexts structuring communication in their own 
different ways, with no scripts behind the process. These contexts are ‘thickenings’ of 
communication, the function of which is to make the acceptance of respective 
communicative offers more probable, and thus the continuation of interaction more likely 
(Nassehi, 2002:455).  
In the differentiation process, generalized symbolic media such as money, power, truth, 
justice and so on, have an essential role to play, because it is their function especially, as 
Luhmann (1997:316) says, to increase the prospects of getting the communicative offers 
accepted, particularly in situations where the always present possibility of outright rejection 
or questioning is more probable. For example, money as a generalized media of exchange 
results in more effective bargaining by making it both easier and quicker. The episode is 
simplified by paying a required amount of money for the item of trade without having to 
dedicate time to discussing the commensurateness of values of the objects of exchange. In 
the same way, justice or legal order with its code legal/illegal simplifies social interaction by 
absorbing social conflicts into its procedures and normative regulations, leaving the 
participants no choice but to accept the legal decision (Luhmann, 1993a, 1996; 1997:332-58).  
Accordingly the differentiation of society happens as an evolvement of different ‘connection 
routines’ of communication, facilitated by the generalized symbolic media, which in relation 
to each other, appear as indifferent system contexts. Therefore, transactions mediated by 
money cumulate to economy, scientific allegations chain to form a scientific subsystem, art 
structures a system through art works referring to former works and anticipating next. 
Indifference in this connection means that the elements of different subsystems are not 
transferable from one system to another; thus e.g. money is not a scientific truth, a piece of 
art work is not a justified legal decision. However many linkages, structural and operational 
couplings there may be between the systems, they do not merge (Luhmann, 1997:359-96; 
Nassehi, 2004). 
Luhmann’s differentiation theory is by no means without its problems. It is difficult for 
many subsystems of society, such as art, health care and education to find a code or 
generalized symbolic media of their own, or choose between the many possible candidates 
(Luhmann, 1997:407-408; see also for example, Sevänen, 2008; Stollberg, 2009). This is a 
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problem, which I will not go into. It is only a reminder that Luhmann’s theory is more like 
toolbox, a ‘distancing’ way to approach social phenomena rather than a readymade theory.  
In this connection, two aspects already mentioned in the foregoing discussion related to 
Luhmann’s differentiation conception are of interest. Firstly, the process happens not as the 
differentiation of society but as processes in society by way of forming different kinds of 
separate communication –‘thickening’ contexts. To underline this difference, Luhmann 
(1997:595-609) refers to this process with the concept of ‘Ausdifferenzierung’ instead of 
‘Differenzierung’ (differentiation) and defines it as a replication of the system/environment 
distinction inside the system, which is itself based on this distinction; in this case, 
communication being distinguished from its environment. This is strongly reminiscent of 
the ‘German’ branch of differentiation theory in which the process is seen as cultivating 
different kinds of separate and selective ways of linking communications and meaning, 
whether they be called cultural systems (Dilthey) or life orders (Weber), each having their 
own peculiar logic of connectivity or rationality. In this respect, Luhmann’s theory is what 
comes to differentiation of society, but a variation of this ‘old theme’. Secondly, in contrast 
to that postulated in theories of functional prerequisites of the existence of society, 
Luhmann’s theory has no aprioristic or necessary reasons for the existence of differentiation 
in the form that it has taken in modern western societies. It is an end effect of a historical 
(and an evolutionary) process, where among the many problems and their different 
solutions arising in daily practice (variation), some are chosen (selection) and have an effect 
in the long run (restabilization), and even beyond the limits of the narrow interactive 
contexts of their origin, to formulate it with the help of the tripartite structure of the basic 
mechanisms of evolutionary change (Luhmann, 1997:456-97).  
The process being cut out of all the necessity and teleology, the reasons for society having 
the structural shape it has in modern (western) societies are only to be found on the basis of 
‘hard’ historical-reconstructive work (Luhmann, 1976:291; 1997:358). In this respect, the 
evolutionary mechanism behind the process of (macro level) changes in society are more 
like speciation, the isolation of a group and its formation into a reproductive community 
closed to itself and finally bringing about a new species, than adaptation, selection and 
reproduction of the specific traits of biological or social systems on the basis of the 
evolutionary advantages the trait, that is, the function offers to its carriers. This was recently 
hinted at by Rudolf Stichweh (2007:532-36). Whereas in the latter case functionality is behind 
the selection mechanism adapting the system to its environment, the former process has 
nothing to do with functionality in this sense. Using functionalist terminology in this 
(adaptionists) sense may be completely misleading what comes to (speciationist) macro- 
evolutionary level of system formation. Its sphere of validity is below that level explaining 
changes in, for example, institutional structure or forms of practice on the basis of adaptive 
advantages. As Hendrik Wortmann (2007:105) succinctly formulates, functions are 
established in systems, not the other way round.  
Nevertheless, Wortmann misses the point by reducing Luhmann’s form of functional 
analysis to a form of ‘typological essentialism’, content to classify empirical phenomena into 
different functional circles, defined more or less from an outside perspective. He (2007:104) 
fails to notice of the dynamism in Luhmann’s functionalism which comes from the 
speciationist way of delineating the differentiation process, and which not only makes ‘fine-
grained’ empirical analysis possible, but in the full meaning of the word, necessary. 
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Luhmann’s functional analysis is not restricted to analysis of dispositional abilities of a unit 
together with classification of social phenomena accordingly. As Stichweh (2007:534; see 
also Milligan, 2010:264) points out, Luhmann has a keen interest in ‘genealogical’ aspect of 
differentiation, interpreted as a genesis of a new system via a new a new 
system/environment –distinction. Luhmann was not altogether free of the need to find 
some kind of an aprioristic foundation for the evolutionary process of change. However, 
both of these ‘ventures’, the attempt to give an account of generalized symbolic media via 
the concept of double contingency and the problematic of causal attribution related to it 
(1997:332-38), as well the attempt to anchor them to different ways of taking into account the 
corporeality of human existence via the concept of symbiotic symbols (1997:378-82), have 
remained more or less sketches. Luhmann (1984:406-9) in some connections also hints at 
using differentiation theory with the idea of functional orientation as a key to interpret 
evolution, as Wortmann (2007:99-100) claims in his earlier mentioned criticism. However, 
already Luhmann’s most important concept related to differentiation (Ausdifferenzierung), 
contradicts this kind of straightforward configuration of differentiation and evolution 
theories.  
In Luhmann’s theory, the modern form of differentiation loses the necessity it has, for 
example, in Parsons’ theory in the sense of ‘adaptive upgrading’, as being the most effective 
way of reducing complexity related to the environment and thus having apparent life 
supporting effects for the existence of society. The modern form of differentiation, or ‘open 
access society’ as it has recently been called (North, et al., 2009), characterized by 
institutional separation and individual freedom, undeniably has some ‘evolutionary 
advantages’ over other more closed forms of society. This stems from its flexibility and 
resulting ability to react rather rapidly to different changes occurring in society and its 
environment. Nevertheless, this is only a partial truth because, as Luhmann (1986) has 
argued, modern society seems in fact to be jeopardizing its ‘material’ conditions of existence 
because of environmental problems, to which it is unable to respond precisely just because 
of its form of differentiation. In addition, attributing some kind of necessity to the modern 
form of differentiation would be at grave odds with the theory like Luhmann’s (1992:93-
129), which defines contingency to be the ‘Eigenvalue’ of modern society.  
This raises the question, which Hartmann Tyrell (1998:144) also points at, namely, is it any 
more possible to speak about functional differentiation in connection with Luhmann’s 
theory with its reformulated functional analysis? Johannes Berger (2003:221) answers this 
question negatively by claiming that the concept of functional differentiation is strictly 
speaking, incompatible with Luhmann’s autopoietic, ‘emergence paradigmatic’ theory of 
constitution of social systems via communication. Berger has made his case, because 
defining the subsystems as at the same time autopoietic, self-referential and self-producing 
systems and as functional subsystems is somehow a contradiction in adjecto. An autopoietic 
system has, by definition, no other ‘purposes’ besides autopoiesis itself, regeneration itself. 
Autopoiesis, as Luhmann (1993a:553) says, is in no way an existence warrant or progress 
concept: it belongs to the same group as the chaos and catastrophe theories. Binding it to 
other purposes makes it, by definition, an allopoietic system, that is, a system directed from 
outside. As a corollary, if the systems are autopoietic, their development and reciprocal 
relations are, by nature, more than anything else the results of an historical process 
characterized by chance and contingency. This reasoning seem to support Andreas 
Reckwitz’s (2003:67) conclusion that in the later phase, when the concept of autopoiesis 
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comes to play an important role in Luhmann’s analysis, the subsystems of society in a strict 
sense lose their status as functional subsystems.  
There is still one possibility to argue on behalf of the functionality of the subsystems, which 
is weaker but in a sense tangential to justification based on functional prerequisites of the 
existence of society. Even if function analysis is above all a scheme of observation and not 
the principle guiding the formation of different subsystems, the latter is not a totally 
excluded possibility. One special feature of systems composed of communication episodes is 
that they are, especially since the development of writing, able to take themselves as targets 
of a kind of ‘second order observation’ and form descriptions of themselves from the point 
of view of their respective ‘leading difference’ (true/not true, legal/illegal and so on) 
constituting their specific point of reference ( that is, function) to the social system as a 
whole (Luhmann, 1982; 1984:404-11, 593-616; 1990:479; 1997:757). This process, in which the 
distinction of system and environment is put to productive use inside the systems, also 
allows a new form of rationality, systems rationality, as a surrogate for the unified 
rationality coming into being, for instance, through the Habermasian discourses and public 
deliberation. Maybe this concept of rationality, by which rationality is decomposed to 
different subsystemic rationalities and defined by the degree they are able to take into 
account their effects on their social and natural environments, and rebound thereof 
(Luhmann, 1984:617-46; see also Kneer, 1992) in their own descriptions and workings, offers 
a way to justify the talk about functional subsystems. One could say that subsystems, no 
matter how they have come into being in first the place, are functional insofar as they are 
oriented at least to some degree in accordance with rationality defined in this way.  
The concept of self-description is not without its problems (Kieselring, 2000; Bonacker, 
2003:266-75), for instance, belong theories related to different functional spheres such as 
economic theories or legal theories to the respective functional subsystem or to the 
subsystem of science. If the former is the case, that seems to blur the distinction between the 
subsystems; if the latter is the case, the question seems to be one of external descriptions 
(Fremdbeschreibung) rather than of self-descriptions. It seems unquestionable that 
descriptions have effects, and often quite unexpected ones on the functioning of systems. 
The financial crisis, the aftermaths of which we now are living, has shown this. It was partly 
caused by new financial instruments developed in the chambers of economics departments 
at different universities. However, to have an effect on these theories by widening their 
horizons from narrow ‘substantial’ topics specific to their fields to take into account the 
wider context (society) is, as the reception of Luhmann’s own theory in the different 
branches of social sciences and humanities has shown, extremely difficult (see, for example, 
de Berg and Schmidt, 2000). In addition, we should not forget, to use Loet Leydesdorff’s 
(2009) vocabulary, that social systems are socially distributed systems, in which operations 
linking communication happen at the same time in countless interactive and organizational 
contexts and with very different premises and anticipations of the future. This feature makes 
the subsystems rather insensitive to any kind of guidance, however self-reflective that may 
be. As Armin Nassehi (2007:170) points out, functional subsystems are constituted by 
operations but do not have the capability to do operations. As modern society itself 
(Luhmann, 1992:126), the subsystems are without a ‘centre or top’ thus mirroring society in 
their own structures.  
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The problems related to this conception do not end here. The vocabulary of functionality in 
this sense awakens the perennial problem of defining the reference unit in respect to which 
something may be said to be functional. To this problem Luhmann’s answers are no more 
valid than those given when Hempel launched his criticism of functionalism (Schwinn, 
2001:58-91). This problematic has even been exacerbated in modern global conditions, where 
the nation-state society, the reference point of Luhmann’s analysis notwithstanding the 
contrary assertions (Stichweh, 2007:528-30), has lost its standing, and the western form of 
modernity has given way to multiple modernities, each defining and configuring the 
subsystems in their own special way. The horizon of society dissolves into multiple horizons 
(Nassehi, 2006:425-437), as does the rationality built on (theoretical) subsystemic self–
reflection, leaving no common denominator.  
The two above-discussed possibilities, the first coming close to the idea of functional 
prerequisites but ruled out by the basic premises of the theory that builds on the concept of 
contingency; the second taking the concept of reflection as its pillar but being at least 
unconvincing in its substantiation, seem to fail. What then would be the reference point 
(problem) that allows to us to speak of functionality, or as Luhmann (1997:163) in one 
connection says, of ‘the advantages of the full actualization of functional differentiation’, in 
regard to the modern (western) form of differentiation of society? One possibility is to argue 
that its functionality relates to some normative ideal, which the modern form of 
differentiation of society helps to bring to fruition. This interpretation is not so far- fetched, 
as it at first sight might appear, not in terms of the tradition of functionalistic differentiation 
thought nor even in the case of Luhmann’s theory, as strange as this claim might sound 
nowadays. Several theorists, as Hans Joas (2008:207) states, have seen in differentiation 
theory a way to resist totalitarian aspirations, and it has been used to explain the coming 
into being of totalitarian regimes by way of a retarded or inhibited differentiation process. 
Alternatively, differentiation that happens too quickly has also been seen as having the same 
effect. Talcott Parsons (1966 [1942]-a, 1966 [1942]-b) accounts for appearance of Nazi-regime, 
according to which the rapid changes in factors such as the economy, technology, 
administration and culture caused an upheaval to which the integrative subsystem of 
society was unable to react at the same tempo. It left the society in a state of anomie, to use 
Durkheim’s expression, susceptible ‘to free floating aggression’ and a coup de état by the 
Nazis, and lead to dedifferentiation of society by putting politics at the head. This kind of 
theorizing is not at all unfamiliar to Luhmann, rather the other way round. His first book 
accentuating differentiation theory Grundrechte als Institution concerning the function of 
basic and human rights as institutions, analyzed these rights as kind of repairing and 
blocking mechanism. Their function is to prevent to political systems’ inherent tendency to 
extend their grip into every corner of society, thus heading to the dedifferentiation that 
happened e.g. in Nazi-totalitarianism (Luhmann, 1965:135; see also Verschraegen, 2002; 
Tyrell, 2006:298-99; Mascareño and Chernilo, 2009:86; Thornhill, 2009).  
This kind of contrafactual use of functional analysis aiming at explicating the conditions of 
possibility of the coming into being or flourishing of social phenomena such as democracy, 
is a valid and interesting type of analysis on its own (see e.g. Giddens, 1977). However, in 
regard to Luhmann’s analysis and how he profiles it in later phases, it is troublesome in two 
respects. Firstly, it is contrary to his expressed intention to offer a detached analysis of 
society without binding it to any specific value assertion, ideals or norms, all of which have 
www.intechopen.com
 
Contingency Theoretical Functionalism and the Problem of Functional Differentiation 71 
become more or less disputable in modern society (Luhmann, 1997:43). Secondly, it would 
reduce the historical interest on the formation of subsystems to a kind of reconstruction of a 
gradual historical realization of the normative ideal à la Immanuel Kant’s (1993 [1784]) ‘Idee 
zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’.  
There is still one possibility left to argue for the functionality of subsystems in a weaker 
sense also in this context of the ‘German’ type of differentiation theory. This is related to the 
fact that subsystems are the ‘thickenings’ of communication, effective ways of reducing 
contingency with the society-wide relevance discussed earlier; in this respect, they have 
become necessary, since they are very hard to replace effectually and extensively with other 
mechanisms reducing contingency (Nassehi, 2004:102). They are further cemented in society 
because subsystems are highly dependent on each other and connected to each other by 
different mechanisms of operational and structural couplings. The subsystem of economy, 
for example, is dependent on the predictability of its social environment, the subsystem of 
law creates with its legal decisions, and vice versa, legal organizations are unable to work 
without the resources coming from the economic subsystem. Necessity, which in this 
connection justifies the talk about functionality, is not the necessity of earlier functional 
theories, which relates to the functional exigencies of the existence and development of 
society, but necessity in a much weaker sense. It is related to the fact that certain ‘problem 
solutions’ with society-wide significance also have far reaching effects on problem 
formations in other contexts of communication, including leaving their imprints on the set 
of possible solutions to the problems (Luhmann, 1970a:20-21). Necessity in this relative 
sense is a consequence (of differentiation) rather than a cause and relates to the ‘de-
arbitration’ (to use Peter Fuchs’ (2003:206) expression) of the problem construction and 
solution. 
Luhmann’s theory is not a predication of the ‘end of history’ (Stark, 2003:234, 244), 
according to which the development of society has reached its final form or destination, a 
state of solicitation after which there can only be quantitative changes, not the coming into 
being of new subsystems, not to speak of the radical changes in the differentiation principle 
itself. The theory does not exclude these possibilities; quite the contrary. Luhmann 
(1984:162-63) draws a parallel between his form of functional analysis and Edmunds 
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction by claiming that the driving force behind the 
analysis is pure analytical interest, as it was for Husserl, which demands that all other 
possible interests or fixed points of approach are bracketed off to whatsoever they may 
relate to: justification, criticism, improvement and so on. Reference to Husserl in this 
connection is not incidental, so significant has Husserl’s influence been to Luhmann’s 
system theory and sociology overall (Srubar, 1989; Knudsen, 2006; Nassehi, 2007). Luhmann 
(1993b: 258-59) sums up the guiding principle of his sociology, the programme of 
‘sociological enlightenment’, in his farewell lecture in Bielefeld by pointing out that the 
purpose of sociology is not to steer society, but to inform it by opening up new ways of 
seeing things through showing the contingent nature of existing arrangements.  
However, as sociological questions it is also interested in the persistence of different ways of 
conditioning contingency. In addition, it asks us to pay attention to the effects, negative as 
well as positive depending on the point of view, which changes in the differentiation of 
society are likely to bring about – be they in the form of development of new kinds of 
subsystems, changes in configurations of how the subsystems relate to each other, or 
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through radical change in differentiation principle in the mode of dedifferentiation, or 
completely new ways to organize society. In this respect too, as Luhmann (1970c) stated in 
the characterization of his sociological intentions already at the beginning of his career, his 
theory aims purely at sociological enlightenment.   
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